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The history and status of Canadian bilateral relations, business, and trade with Cuba have
been a source of some controversy in the United States. Not long ago, I participated in a
series of debates-at times heated-before U.S. audiences on the subject of Canadian op-
position to the Helms-Burton Act of 1996.1 Those gatherings were prompted by a com-
paratively rare impasse in political and international legal discourse between the United
States and Canada, along with other key allies and trading partners, for which Cuba-with
or without Castro-served more as a lightning rod, rather than the core focus for a more
general and protracted disagreement on the subject of extraterritoriality.' In the latter con-
text, it is useful to recall that, well before lightning struck over Cuba, Canada felt compelled
to enact general blocking legislation as a tool to render business actors under Canadian
jurisdiction at least as miserable complying with the purported extraterritorial reach of any
U.S. laws so designated as they might otherwise have been in breaching them. Only later
was this tool enlisted specifically in defence of growing trade with Cuba.'
*This article is an adaptation of the text for remarks at the Stetson University College of Law Programme:
Doing Business in Cuba: Preparing for a Post-Castro Cuba, Tampa, Florida, April 12, 2002.
-Barrister and Solicitor, Toronto, Canada, A.B., 1974, LL.B., 1977 (Queen's), LL.M., 1979 (N.Y.U.), S.J.D.,
1987 (Harvard). I am grateful to the following individuals in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Interna-
tional Trade (Canada) for directing me to helpful sources of information on Canada-Cuba relations: Kim
Cowan, Chad Fleck, and Stephen Brereton; practical insights from James Klotz are also gratefully acknowl-
edged, together with the technical assistance of Mona Pai. Errors that remain are mine alone.
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-14, 110 Stat. 785
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (2002)) [hereinafter Helms-Burton].
2. See, e.g., H. Scott Fairley, Third-State Obections to the Extraterritorial Application of National Laws: A Focus
on Helms-Burton, 91 Am. Soc'v OF INT'L LAW PRoc. 339 (1997) [hereinafter ASIL Procs.]; H. Scott Fairley, Why
the Helms-Burton Act Violates International Law, 23 CAN. COONS. ON INT'L LAW BULL. 10 n.2-3 (1997); contra
Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with International Law, 90 Am. J. INT'L L.
434(1996).
3. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1984) (Can.) (as amended). For a useful
commentary on the genesis of this legislation as a response to the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust and
securities laws as applied by U.S. courts, see William C. Graham, The Foreign E&traterritorialMeasures Act, 11
CAN. J. Bus. L. 410 (1986). See also infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
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Canadian-American policy differences over Cuba remain unresolved. However, the im-
passe is one our respective governments and international business communities have man-
aged to live with, notwithstanding clearly conflicting laws between our two jurisdictions
and equally antithetical positions on their appropriate reach. With profuse apologies to our
third North American trading partner, the prevailing Canadian-American status quo on
Cuba may be best viewed as a classic Mexican stand off.
4
Even allowing for the current status quo, however, one can now speculate rationally on
the prospect of the United States re-establishing relations with and Americans doing busi-
ness in Cuba. For the most part, such discussion necessarily pre-supposes re-engagement
only with a post-Castro Cuba. Yet, at that juncture, one should also seriously question
whether Cuba will be a radically different country to either relate to or do business with
after Fidel Castro passes into history. President Castro inevitably will, but his legacy is
another matter. Eventually, history will tell us. In the meantime, we can only reason from
what we presently know. From that vantage point a Canadian perspective-though in no
shape or form official-may be of some value.
II. Relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba
Cuba enjoys essentially normal diplomatic and economic relations with most nations,
including Canada, for which diplomatic relations have been uninterrupted since 1945. From
1899 until Castro's accession to power in 1959, Cuba had been a nominally independent
protectorate of the United States following military intervention by the United States in
support of a Cuban rebellion against Spain in the spring of 1898, and the formal cession
of Cuba to the United States at the conclusion of the Spanish American war later that year.'
Fidel Castro, originally a young Cuban lawyer and political candidate for public office
in the Cuban national election scheduled forJune 1952, became a local social revolutionary
figure following the successful coup d'etat of Fulgencio Batista, who seized power in March
of 1952 and maintained a dictatorship thereafter. After an unsuccessful attempt to topple
the Batista government the following year, a trial, conviction and imprisonment in Cuba,
Castro was released and exiled to Mexico in 1955. In December 1956, Castro returned to
Cuba with a new revolutionary cadre, jointly led by an Argentinean physician, Ernesto
"Che" Guevara. This second guerrilla war against Batista ultimately became a successful
4. This observation is informed by the comparative rarity of substantive cases and controversies between
Canada and the United States under their opposing legislation, and by my own experience in advisingCanadian-
based corporations on how to avoid being the source for such precedents. Two examples stand out. First, on
the Canadian side, the abortive attempt by Wal-Mart (U.S.) to induce Wal-Mart (Can.) to stop selling Cuban
sourced clothing in its Canadian retail outlets in the spring of 1997. See ASIL Procs., supra note 2, at 339-40.
Second, on the U.S. side, the current U.S. government criminal prosecution of Purolite, a Pennsylvania-based
company, and certain of its officers for alleged violations of the Cuban embargo, interalia through its Canadian
office, which action went to trial in Philadelphia before the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in March of 2002. United States v. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D. Pa. 2001). For a more
scholarly analysis that tends to support my observation from a U.S. perspective, see Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre
Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 94-95 (1998).
5. The U.S. intervention in Cuba in 1898 was justified principally in terms of U.S. interests, but also as a
humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Cuban people. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 290-91, 340, 346, 290 nn.1-6, 291 nn.l-10, 340 nn.I-10, 346 nn.l-6 (1963); see
generally ELEERTJAY BENTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR (P. Smith
ed., 1908).
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revolution. Castro assumed power at the head of Cuba's socialist government on New Year's
Day, 1959. Cuba became the first communist state in the western hemisphere. Initial rec-
ognition of the Castro government by the United States soon gave way to economic es-
trangement arising out of closer economic ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union, which
sustained the former for the most part until the final break-up of the latter in 1991.6
The brief historical snapshot is instructive for present purposes, if only to note that apart
from the neo-colonial attachment, which the United States readily renounced by recog-
nizing Cuba's new government at the outset of the Castro regime, the United States, Can-
ada, and other nations all started to deal with the new Cuba from the common vantage
point of defacto and dejure recognition of a new status quo. What very quickly distinguished
the U.S. position and attitude from that of other nations, however, was not merely com-
munist verses western ideology, but a litany of unfortunate politics. From the abortive U.S.
supported debacle at the Bay of Pigs, to Fidel Castro becoming an agent of Soviet efforts
to tip the nuclear balance of terror in its favour at the height of a Cold War during the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962,1 the prospect for future U.S. relations with Castro's Cuba
was perhaps irretrievably lost.
The Castro dictatorship and Castro the person remain a visceral raw nerve in the politics
and foreign policy of the United States that has persistently refused to heal, spawning a
continuing-if also controversial-legacy of embargo and related economic and legal sanc-
tions.' This legacy shows no signs of dissipating so long as Castro remains in power-even
though the original threats are long gone, and notwithstanding an impatient U.S. business
community that has argued strongly against the utility of sanctions, citing in particular,
significant opportunity costs for the U.S. economy in maintaining them.9 However, this
article is the product of a perspective of what may be done for the business case before, as
well as in anticipation of President Castro's departure from the scene.
The rest of the international community, including Canada, has never had reason to view
Castro's Cuba in the same light as successive generations of U.S. legislative actors-Helms,
Burton, and Torricelli. l° Yet, it should also be stated-at least from the Canadian perspective
with which I am most familiar-that many of the United States' principal ongoing concerns
about the laws and policies of the Castro government are widely shared. The fundamental
difference that separates the United States from its major allies and trading partners is one
of method in how to deal with those concerns. A public statement by Christine Stewart,
6. See THE CANADIAN TRADE COMM'N SEEV., CUBA: A GUIDE FOR CANADIAN BUSINESS 3-6 (3d ed. 2001),
available at http://www.infoexport.gc.ca/ie-en/Office.jsp?oid = 121 (providing a historical and cultural overview
for Canada) (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
7. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (rev. ed. 1987) (providing the international law aspects
of this confrontation).
8. See MICHAEL KRINSKY & DAVID GOLOVE, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA (1993)
(providing critical domestic analysis of the U.S. embargo of Cuba); see generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL.,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed., 1990); MICHAEL P. MALLOY, UNITED STATES EcoNoMIc SANC-
TIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001).
9. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES 1993-96 (1997) (critiquing U.S. sanctions policy).
10. The reference here is to the namesake Congressional sponsor of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.
See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10
(2002)) (purporting to extend the sanction of the U.S. embargo of Cuba to U.S. owned and/or controlled
subsidiaries operating in other jurisdictions).
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Canadian Secretary of State for Latin America, made as part of Canada's official response to
the perceived excesses of Helms-Burton, succinctly captures the alternative methodologies:
In the broadest sense, I believe we share many of the same goals as the United States. Our
aim is a peaceful transition in Cuba to a genuinely representative government that fully respects
internationally agreed human rights standards. And we look forward to Cuba's becoming an
open economy. However, we differ from the United States on how to reach these objectives.
We have chosen the path of engagement and dialogue; the United States has picked isolation.Il
The purpose of this article is not to defend Canada's chosen policy toward Cuba or critique
that of the United States, 2 rather, to pursue whatever insight might be gleaned from Can-
ada's present policy of engagement with Cuba. Putting aside current judgments on wisdom,
what do the lessons of engagement tell us going forward? Presumably-and it is again the
underlying assumption of this article-the United States and U.S. businesses plan to engage
vigorously after Castro is gone, making every effort to make up for lost time. The substan-
tive touchstones highlighted by Minister Stewart in the above-quoted passage are democ-
racy, human rights, and a free-market economy. These themes also provide a useful focus
for an analysis of where Canadian policies of engagement have tended to lead.
A. ENCOURAGING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA
Dealing with an ultimately totalitarian regime always leaves those who do vulnerable to
the charge that they are profiting from the misery of the oppressed. The most visible
Canadian lightning rod for this kind of controversy has been the substantial mining opera-
tions of Sherritt International at Moa Bay in Cuba. Sherritt executives are to date the only
Canadian pariahs designated under Title IV of Helms-Burton, but that designation relates to
an administrative finding of trafficking in confiscated property, not alleged human rights
abuses. 3 The latter have been the subject of journalistic discussion, which Sherritt Chairman,
Ian Delaney, stoutly rejected, defending Sherritt's contribution not only to Castro's coffers
and the Cuban economy, but also to the lot of the Cuban worker.' 4 Such allegations and
rhetoric apparently never progressed to the level of a formal complaint to or adverse findings
by any international human rights tribunal or agency against either Sherritt or any other
Canadian business entity. Nevertheless, political sensitivity in Canada and elsewhere prompted
similar political efforts to advance human rights as well as economic agendas in Cuba.
In December of 1996, the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU) was the
first to move, with the adoption of a Common Position on Cuba,' which emphasized the
diplomatic and economic objective of EU-Cuban relations "to encourage a process of tran-
11. See Honourable Christine Stewart, Secretary of State for Latin America & Africa, Notes for an Address
to the Symposium on Helms-Burton and International Business (May 16, 1996) (available from the Canada
Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade).
12. H. Scott Fairley, Exceeding the Limits of Territorial Bounds: The Helms-Burton Act, 34 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
161 (1997) (making the argument on point) [hereinafter Exceeding the Limits]; see generally H. Scott Fairley &
John H. Currie, Projecting Beyond the Boundaries: A Canadian Perspective on the Double-Edged Sword of Extrater-
ritorial Acts, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: RELEVANCE OF DOMESTIC LAW &
PoLIcY 119-148 (Michael K. Young & Yuji Iwasawa eds. 1996).
13. See Helms-Burton, supra note 1; see also Exceeding the Limits, supra note 12, at 168-72.
14. Compare Z. Olijnyk, Sherritt's Delaney Defends Cuban Operations, FIN. POST, Feb. 25, 1997, at 13, with C.
Lane, Cuban Trade: Canada's Hypocrisy over Helms-Burton, GLOBE & MAIL, July 27, 1997, at D2.
15. Council Directive 96/697/CFSP, 1996 O.J. (L322) 1, reprinted in European Union: Council of Ministers
Common Position on Cuba, 36 I.L.M. 213 (1997).
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sition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms," in
tandem with improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people." That objective,
however, was premised on a process of evolutionary change within Cuba that "[a] transition
would most likely be peaceful if the present regime were itself to initiate or permit such a
process. It is not European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures
with the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people."' 7
The EU approach, while arguably a transparent effort to assist President Clinton in
making a good political case for exercising restraint in implementing the full agenda of
Helms-Burton,"8 still mapped a very different course than the imposition of sanctions. The
EU Common Position stresses working with rather than against the Castro government,
avowedly in pursuit of a constructive, result-oriented dialogue with Cuba and closer eco-
nomic cooperation as Cuban authorities make progress towards democracy. 9
The Canadian strategy was essentially the same-for many of the same reasons. But
Canada succeeded in going one step further in making a timely human rights initiative
jointly with the Government of Cuba, instead of simply another unilateral declaration of
intent. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy paid a visit to Cuba in January
of 1997, which concluded with a Canada-Cuba Joint Declaration on Cooperation on Po-
litical, Economic and Social Issues (oint Declaration)? ° Minister Axworthy's counterpart
for these negotiations was not Fidel Castro, of course, but then Foreign Affairs Minister
Roberto Robaina Gonzalez. Together, they set out a non-binding agenda "to advance to-
wards new initiatives within the framework of their bilateral relationship," including:
1. Cooperation in the area of the administration of justice and the judicial-legal system,
including exchanges of judges and judicial training.
2. Support exchanges between the House of Commons and the National Assembly, fo-
cusing on the operations of both institutions.
3. Exchange of experiences between both countries relating to the Cuban intention to
strengthen within the National Assembly of People's Power a Citizens' Complaints
Commission.
4. Broadening and deepening cooperation on the issue of human rights, which will in-
clude the preparation of seminars on diverse matters of mutual interest, academic
exchanges between officials, professionals and experts, as well as sharing experiences
and positions on the work of the specialized organizations of the United Nations.
5. Supporting the activities of Canadian and Cuban non-governmental organizations
within the framework of bilateral cooperation between both countries and in accor-
dance with the laws and regulations of each country.
6. Continuation of macroeconomic cooperation, with an initial focus in the areas of
taxation and central banking, while studying joint areas in which Canada might con-
tinue to support the Cuban policy of economic reform.
7. The negotiation of a Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement ....
16. Id. at 214, 1.
17. Id.
18. President Bill Clinton, Statement on Suspending Title III of the Helms-Burton Act (Jan. 3, 1997), in
36 I.L.M. 216 (1997); see also Exceeding the Limits, supra note 12, at 204.
19. Council Directive 96/697/CFSP, supra note 15, $ 3-4.
20. Canadian Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade Media Relations Office, Done at Havana (Jan. 22,
1997), in 36 I.L.M. 210 (1997).
21. Id. at211-212.
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There were seven other areas of cooperation specifically named. The initial seven quoted
above, however, are the most relevant for illustrating the point of change from within and
the development of strong bilateral relationships of understanding, trust, and confidence
going forward as change occurs.
This ongoing policy of engagement does not necessarily yield immediate dividends. In
fact, Canada-Cuba relations have substantially deteriorated since the 1997 Joint Declara-
tion. The failure of the Castro government to further the democratic agenda and a general
hardening of its attitude to political dissidents, rather than the reverse contemplated by
Minister Axworthy in 1997, lies at the root of the current frostiness. The currently posted
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) statement on Canada-
Cuba Relations emphasizes:
[D]espite Canada's commitment to an engagement policy, the Canadian government has re-
sponded decisively to the deteriorating political situation in Cuba over the last two years. After
a period marked by uneven progress in Cuba's commitment to economic and political reform,
1999 and 2000 have witnessed deterioration. Several problems have been particularly worri-
some, namely: ideological tightening; little progress on basic rights, such as freedom of ex-
pression; increasing use of short-term detention and harassment against political activists;
stalled progress towards a large-scale religious opening; continued Cuban attempts to weaken
the UN human rights system; and slow application of economic reform, which has frustrated
foreign businesses and prevented the nascent private sector from coming into play as a signifi-
cant alternate source of growth.
In the face of these problems, Canada undertook a program review ordered by the Prime
Minister. As a result of the review, any new or expanded Canadian initiatives are being examined
on a case-by-case basis to ensure that programming reinforces areas of positive change in Cuba,
such as civil society, good governance, economic policy reform and direct humanitarian assis-
tance to the Cuban people. Continued emphasis is being placed on engaging non-state part-
ners, including the Church and civil society. Established programs and commercial relations
are proceeding normally."
The same document notes that Canada has channelled approximately $35 million in de-
velopment aid into Cuba since the mid-1990s, that academic and cultural relations between
universities, municipalities, and artistic organizations are growing significantly, as is Canadian
tourism," but the overall message is decidedly mixed. The Prime Minister of Canada, Jean
Chretien, last visited Cuba in April 1998. President Castro attended the funeral of former
Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, in September 2000, and met with Prime Minister Chretien
at that time. Yet the DFAIT commentary makes a point of noting that, notwithstanding that
meeting, "there were no new breakthroughs in Canada-Cuba relations." 4
In short, the current state of Canada-Cuba relations is far from ideal. One product of
the Prime Minister's program review with respect to Cuba is that there have been no further
visits of senior Canadian public officials to Cuba since the spring of 1999.11 Small wonder
then that the possibility of a bilateral foreign investment protection and promotion agree-
22. CANADA DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, CANADA-CU1A RELATIONS, at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/1atinamerica/cuba relations-e.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2002) (Emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Telephone Interview with Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade, Cuba Desk (Mar. 6, 2002) (here-
inafter Interview].
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ment, Canada's functional equivalent of the U.S. bilateral investment treaty formula for
protecting foreign investment in the host state,26 has to date and five years down the road
not materialized. Apart from apparently healthy academic and cultural exchanges of various
kinds on the individual and institutional levels, the same may be said of the other items on
the democracy and human rights agenda of the joint Declaration. On the other hand, either
signatory has specifically repudiated none of these putatively shared goals. The next ques-
tion, of course, is where to from here.
At this juncture, it appears to be President Castro's call to move things along. For this
to happen, the Cuban government would have to commit to significantly increased trans-
parency in its actions and accountability for them. Such standards of governance remain
fundamentally difficult for the Castro regime to contemplate, let alone implement-all the
more so for being the product of alien forces laying siege to an isolated ideology. The fact
that the policy of constructive engagement has been a good deal less hostile in form and
method than the U.S. alternative does not make it any less foreign in application. In that
regard, Canada may be able to push the frontier of democracy in Cuba only so far.
B. EcONOMic RELATIONS: ENcoURAGING A FREE? MARKET
Canada entered into substantial economic relations with Cuba prior to any settlement of
outstanding Canadian claims with respect to confiscated property and investments, but the
latter were in fact settled by agreement in 1980.27 Information is scarce, however, on the
issue of how "adequate, effective, and prompt"2 the claims settlements of individual cases
proved to be. Nevertheless, a twenty-one year wait for negotiated settlements is quite
some time.
In the meantime, ongoing politics of engagement prompted treaty arrangements on the
economic and financial fronts to facilitate trade and business relations with a cash-strapped
country, albeit one with a sometimes unpredictable central economy. A technical cooper-
ation agreement was concluded in 1974;29 an all-important agreement extending a devel-
opment line of credit followed in 1975.30 Two years later, the two countries concluded a
further agreement on fisheries relations.3
The volume of Canada-Cuba trade has fluctuated over the years, synchronized to some
extent with the ebb and flow of Canada-Cuba relations. From 1996 through 2000, two way
26. The current foreign investment protection and promotion agreement (FIPA) formula is derived from
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) model and, as of this writing, Canada has bilateral
FIPAs currently in force with sixteen other countries, and two other FIPAs (with South Africa and El Salvador)
have been signed, but are not yet in force. See Canada Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade, Trade Ne-
gotiations and Agreements: Regional and Bilateral Agreements, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/fipa-
e.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Trade Negotiations].
27. Agreement relating to the Settlement of Canadian Claims, Nov. 7, 1980, Can.-Cuba, 1981 Can. T.S.
No. 18.
28. IN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 532 (4th ed. 1990). This is the classicWestern
formulation of the manner and level of compensation required when a host government expropriates property
of a foreign national. This is the formulation employed by both Canada and the United States in their respective
FIPA and bilateral investment treaties. See, e.g., id. at 532-36; Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion
Agreement, Can.-Egypt, 1997 Can. T.S. No. 31; Trade Negotiations, supra note 26.
29. Technical Co-operation Agreement, Feb. 8, 1974, Can.-Cuba, 1974 Can. T.S. No. 8.
30. Agreement Establishing for Cuba a Development Line of Credit, Mar. 18, 1975, Can-Cuba, 1975 Can.
T.S. No. 9 [hereinafter Line of Credit].
31. Agreement on Mutual Fishing Relations, May 12, 1977, Can.-Cuba, 1977 Can. T.S. No. 17.
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trades ranged from $690.6 million to a peak of $815.7 million in 1998, falling to just under
$702 million the following year, and then recovering to $736.6 million in 2000.32 Unofficial
statistics, preliminary for 2001, for Canadian balance of trade figures show a modestly
positive balance in Canada's favour: $391.7 million in exports and $361.3 million in imports,
for a two way total of $753 million." The DFAIT's annual report, Opening Doors to the
World: Canada's International Market Access Priorities 2001,34 has only a brief note about
Cuba, among other Caribbean countries, but does state that "Cuba is Canada's largest
market in the Caribbean, and Canada is Cuba's biggest foreign investor world-wide," add-
ing that, "[i]n spite of Canadian successes in Cuba, however, business dealings in a centrally
controlled economy can be difficult, especially for the inexperienced exporter.""
This cautionary note crops up with instructive frequency in DFAIT literature. The latest
DFAIT statement on Canada-Cuba Trade and Investment reiterates that "Cuba is not an
easy market .... There have been instances when Canadian small and medium-sized en-
terprises have encountered difficulties in trying to do business in Cuba simply because of
the nature of Cuba's centrally planned economy, which is distinctly different from other
Latin American economies. '36 The nature of this trade from the Canadian side is mostly
agri-food such as cereals and meat, machinery, motor vehicles, electrical equipment, and
fertilizers, while the Cuban flow is primarily metallic ores and concentrates, sugar, tobacco
(those celebrated-or infamous- Cuban cigars), and seafood."
History may prove that the larger players fare better than the smaller ones, particularly
when doing business on the ground in Cuba. Indeed, approximately 80 percent of Canadian
imports for 2001 are metallic ores and concentrates, with most attributable to Sherritt
International's nickel mining operations at Moa Bay.3
III. Doing Business in Cuba: Some Contemporary Realities
My own experience in advising Canadian companies selling to, buying from, or contem-
plating investments in Cuba has focused on the issue of risk analysis and advice more in
the context of Canadian-American relations than Cuban-Canadian relations. In those in-
stances, clients have been at least as worried about steering between the Scylla and Cha-
rybdis of directly conflicting foreign policies and laws that affect other markets as they
might be about the hazards of doing business in Cuba once they get there. Colleagues have
also engaged in the latter, however, and our collective experience suggests that DFAIT's
cautionary tales are well worth noting. Cuba continues to present a unique opportunity
that will appeal to some, but not others.
32. See CANADA DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, CUBA FACT SHEET, OCT. 2000, at http://
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cocs/82015-e.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002) (noting that for the same period (1996-
2000), the balance of trade was predominantly but not exclusively in Canada's favour, being substantially in
Cuba's favour in 1996 (C$401.2 million to C$289.4 million) and again in 2000 (C$408.5 million to C$328.1
million)).
33. Interview, supra note 25 (providing preliminary statistics).
34. CANADA DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, OPENING DOORS TO THE WORLD, at http://
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/2001/4-e.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
35. Id.
36. CANADA DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, CANADA-CUBA TRADE AND INVESTMENT, at http:/
/www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latinamerica/cubatrade-e.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
37. Id.
38. Interview, supra note 25.
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A. THE CAUTIONARY OVERVIEW
The Government of Canada has devoted considerable effort and resources through its
embassy in Havana and government departments at home to give Canadian businesses and
investors a good idea of what they are likely to encounter in Cuba-something the U.S.
Government will undoubtedly undertake in due course, if this work has not already been
done. Most of this information is freely available on Canada's government Web sites, with
only some restrictions applying to selected materials, such as current market analyses, which
is only accessible from Canadian electronic mail addresses.' 9
A particularly useful document is Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business,40 a 130-page
synopsis of Cuba's history, culture, and economy. The Guide includes a detailed sectoral
overview, analysis of infrastructure, and pointers on investment, trade, and the regulatory
environment. There is also a respectful discussion of the U.S. embargo, an analysis of the
local business environment, and information about where to get help, including a compre-
hensive list of domestic and foreign contacts. The introduction to this treasure-trove for
the uninitiated is instructive for what can only be regarded, again, as a distinctly mixed
message:
Cuba is an emerging market with significant potential for Canadian exporters and
investors....
The attractiveness of these opportunities is mitigated by the continuing embargo of Cuba
by the United States, including legislation that attempts to impose American laws on companies
in other countries. Canada has enacted amendments to the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Act (FEMA), which counteract these laws .... Nonetheless, Canadian companies with assets
in the United States will have to consider their actions in Cuba very carefully.
While these American laws increase the risk for Canadian companies moving into the Cuban
market, they also prevent American competitors from entering the market, except sporadically
and through circuitous means. Partly for this reason, Cuba offers a variety of opportunities for
new market entrants. Canadian companies who are used to taking on entrenched American
competitors in other Latin American markets will find a much different environment in Cuba,
where the principal competitors are from Latin America (especially Mexico) and Europe (es-
pecially Spain, Italy and France), as well as from Asia.
In spite of these attractions, Cuba is definitely not for the timid or the unprepared. The
country has a high-risk business environment, where many foreign ventures have failed. Com-
panies moving into Cuba today face a regulatory regime that is less than transparent even by
developing country standards. Negotiations with government entities are characterized by deep
distrust of capitalist motives and abrupt changes in position. Even after a deal has been reached
through good faith bargaining with Cuban negotiators, senior officials may demand amend-
ments. Some Cuban government companies can be financial unreliable and collections of even
secured debts can be difficult.
Business ethics have been adversely affected as Cuba's liquidity situation deteriorates. There
is a growing concern about the potential instability surrounding the inevitable succession of a
new leadership and the eventual end to the American embargo. Canadian investors must bal-
ance the advantages of early entry into a dynamic market against the risks of abrupt changes
in business conditions.
39. See CANADA DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, available at http://
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/menu-e.asp; see also CANADIAN TRADE COMM'N SERv., available at http:!/
www.infoexport.gc.ca (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
40. CUBA: A GUIDE FOR CANADIAN BUSINESS, supra note 6.
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The companies that succeed are those that arrive with a solid medium-term business strategy
and the resources and staying power needed to establish a high profile in the Cuban market.
Officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade suggest that the Cuban
market is appropriate only for companies with annual sales in excess of $1 million. They add
that the company should be prepared to commit an executive at least halftime, with a minimum
promotion budget in the order of $ 100,000 per year, and it should not expect to earn a return
within the first two or three years .... 41
So, there you have it-a reasonably frank bottom-line from DFAIT, and bottom-line cut-
off in terms of resources on what it considers to be the minimum commitment a business
must make in the Cuban market. Both patience and caution remain distinct-and neces-
sary-virtues to succeed.
B. NEGOTIATING THE DEAL
Be prepared for the long haul. The Guide states candidly that "[nlegotiations with Cuban
government entities are characterized by a deep distrust of capitalist motives. Understand-
ably, the government's objective is to obtain the maximum amount of foreign capital with
the minimum amount of foreign influence in the economy and the lowest possible benefit
to foreign investors. ' 42 This atmosphere frequently results in negotiated terms and under-
standings being reopened as the deal moves up the food chain of government responsibility.
This pattern of negotiation, if not deal-breaking in scope and content, is both immensely
frustrating and time-consuming when measured against typical international business prac-
tice. If the Cuban government were to publish and keep current a directory of Who's Still
Who, for all its ministries and their subsidiary government-owned corporations, the average
length of the process might be abbreviated and its indeterminacy curtailed. To the best of
my knowledge, no such publication is available.
In one instance where client confidentiality precludes the helpfulness of providing details
and context, the negotiations were substantially upset when it became apparent that several
of the officers of the corporate subsidiary responsible at first instance were utilizing the
transaction as a potential vehicle for facilitating their defection to Canada. I am pleased to
say that the client was saved from the brink of an international incident, but it also subse-
quently withdrew from its Cuban partnership. Prior to that point, a government directory
of Who's No Longer Who would have been extremely helpful, but alas, that is another
good publishing idea that has not been implemented.
Canadian experience suggests that, from the presentation of the conceptual proposal of
a typical joint venture until final approval, the negotiation process can take up to three
years and completion in anything less than eighteen months would be rare indeed. 43 One
starts with identifying the government ministry in charge of the economic sector applicable
to the proposed investment, and then drilling down to the most appropriate subsidiary of
the ministry in question to negotiate the deal at first instance. The deal is then subject to
ministerial approval and finally, approval by the Executive Committee of the Council of
Ministers. For all practical purposes, Executive Committee approval is required for all joint
venture arrangements of any significance, and it is formally required to approve all invest-
ments exceeding ten million dollars.-
41. Id. at 1-2.
42. Id. at 54; see generally id. at 49-62.
43. Id. at 54.
44. Id. at 54-57.
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Descriptions of the actual legal and administrative framework through which the nego-
tiations take place are beyond the scope of this article's mandate, and merit several articles
to convey any kind of detailed understanding. It is understandable, however, and of com-
paratively recent vintage, postdating Cuba's loss of the Soviet umbrella in the early 1990s.
Negotiations between foreign investors and Cuban government entities are all overseen by
the Bureau of Negotiations of the Ministerio para la Inversion Extranjera y la Colaboracion
Economica-that is, the Ministry for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation-
pursuant to the current foreign investment law, Decree Law 77 that dates from 1995 .4 The
laws and institutions are not the issue; these are modern, flexible and, for the most part, on
their face, reasonable. Uncertainty and concomitant risk arise primarily with the layered
bureaucracy that applies them.
C. SELLING INTO CUBA: COLLECTING ON THE DEAL
Your customer in Cuba is still, one way or another, the government. Increasingly, the
Castro government is permitting its various ministries to do business with foreign sellers
through semi-autonomous government-owned corporations, the more familiar Sociedad
Anonima, or S.A. Nothing, however, can be sold in Cuba except through a government-
approved entity. Commodities fall within defined economic sectors for which a particular
ministry is responsible, its designated S.A., or, in some sectors, conglomerates of
government-owned production companies, uniones, which have been formed to coordinate
production and distribution of commodities such as paper, plastics, and agri-food.46
Goods can only be imported by government entities and joint ventures in Cuba holding
permits for specific commodities. Joint venture vehicles may also entail duty-free status or
reduced duties in relation to the designated products of the proposed joint venture, an item
that is typically on the table in negotiating the joint venture agreement.47 However, the
prospect of securing tariff exemptions or reductions, if considered essential to the viability
of the business proposal, brings us back full circle to the vagaries of that protracted process.
Clearly, if a large volume of trade is to be contemplated and actively sought, the platform
of a joint venture or economic association established in Cuba, which then becomes the
entity you trade with, is a virtual necessity. Once again, there is no escaping direct govern-
ment involvement. Ultimately, there is no one else.
In the absence of negotiated exemptions, tariffs range from a simple average of 10.7
percent for most commodities from most favoured nation (MFN) countries to a maximum
MFN rate of 30 percent.4 Canada enjoys the MFN rates, along with other countries with
which Cuba has bilateral agreements. From 2000, as a result of a special trade deal on
petroleum imports, Venezuela became Cuba's largest trading partner, followed by Spain,
Canada, the Netherlands (including the Netherlands Antilles), China, and Russia, essen-
tially in that order.49
Winning the contracts one wants appears just as problematic as the process of creating
the joint venture apparatus that effectively becomes one's buyer of record. The government
45. Seeid. at49, 51, & 58.
46. Id. at 69-70, see generally id. at 63-79.
47. Id. at 73.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 63.
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is always there and particularly vigilant concerning all hard currency transactions, which
are-it should be fair to say-the only ones of interest to foreign commercial actors. Here
again, Canada's Guide to business is perhaps un-Canadian in its frankness:
The procurement process can be complex, since hard currency spending is often under the control
of the supervising ministry and the Council of Ministers, rather than the purchasing entity.
The procurement process lacks transparency, even by third-world standards. Potential cor-
ruption is controlled by close observation of both Cuban and foreign negotiators and by mem-
bers of the security apparatus, rather than by exposing the overall procurement process to
public scrutiny, as is the case in Canada. The process is shrouded in secrecy and there are no
formal competitive bids. Moreover, the details of contract awards are not released. 0
A crucial element in all this is ensuring that one is paid after the deal is done and as
promptly as possible once the goods are delivered. When it comes to the money from the
Cuban side, credit to facilitate the transaction remains a must, because Cuba is always cash-
strapped for hard currency. Otherwise the likelihood of any deal is exceedingly remote;
from the vendor's point of view, insurance against payment becomes similarly indispensable.
In this regard, a Canadian governmental credit facility with Cuba probably ranks as a sine
qua non for most Canadian businesses to even approach the Cuban market, with the Export
Development Corporation (EDC), a Canadian federal Crown corporation, providing
needed insurance, financing, or both.l In this regard, Canada, through the EDC, holds
approximately $114 million of the Government of Cuba's external debt.,, This may not be
a particularly alarming figure, but nonetheless furnishes another illuminating indicator of
the real cost of doing business in Cuba.
IV. Concluding Observations
Canada continues to value and pursue its economic relationship with Cuba. Canadian
business also values the opportunity it has been given, particularly given the current self-
induced exclusion of U.S. competition. At the same time, Canada remains committed to
securing progress on the diplomatic and political aspects of its relationship, notably in the
advancement of individual human rights and democratic institutions within Cuba.
The common denominator for Canada's efforts can be summed up under the rubric of
constructive engagement. That process is currently stalled at the highest political levels,
due to recent reversals of previous Cuban trends toward, and commitments to, increased
political tolerance and more democratic institutions. However, Canada shows no signs of
retreating from its chosen path, nor-in this writer's view-should it. On balance, the policy
has worked to the mutual benefit and betterment of Cubans and Canadians, not merely to
profit certain Canadian businesses or enhance Canadian trade statistics. Nevertheless, one
must also acknowledge that the Canadian policy-shared with other democratic free market
economies-has yet to succeed on its fundamentals.
50. Id. at 69.
51. Export Development Act, R.S.C., ch. E-20, (1985) (Can.) (as amended) (governing the Export Devel-
opment Corporation's mandate as a Crown Corporation), available at http://laws.justice.qc.ca/en/e-20/
51623.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2002); see Export Development Canada, available at http://wwww.edc.ca (last
visited Sept. 12, 2002); see also Line of Credit, supra note 30, and accompanying text.
52. CUBA FACT SHEET, supra note 32.
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Canadian frustration with an apparently deteriorating status quo on fundamental issues
of democratic governance and human rights in Cuba can be attributed to the twin failures-
or twin refusals-of the Cuban government to embrace transparency in its actions and, at
the same time, render itself accountable for them. Acceptable accountability from any ex-
ternal standpoint-not just the Canadian one-entails measurement against internationally
accepted norms. On this score, the institutional foundations necessary to secure such ac-
ceptance in Cuba are still lacking. Without these, Canada and Canadian businesses have
found that the politics of the Cuban central economy places severe and consequential lim-
itations on the business economics of dealing with it.
For Canadian business at the practical level, Cuba remains a difficult, demanding, but
still worthwhile customer. Demanding customers are nothing new to any business and are
more than to be expected in competitive international markets. Nevertheless, the nature
and scope of the demands posed by Cuban governmental and business entities-and the
officialdom of senior politics to which they are inextricably tied and subordinated-makes
for unfamiliar, disturbingly opaque business risks being the ongoing order of the day. Ca-
nadian experience suggests that these have been, and can be, successfully handled, provided
one is patient, flexible and does not have excessive business expectations.
Canadian experience with Cuban politics and Cuban business over time may further
suggest that many lessons learned could still apply even after the passing of Fidel Castro.
The future Cuba with which the United States will ultimately re-engage, will conceivably
retain many of the same characteristics and methods, at least in the short and medium term,
that are part and parcel of Castro's Cuba, notwithstanding that the person will be gone.
The Castro government continues to govern, enjoying close to a half-century of unin-
terrupted power. Whether or not President Castro will retain office to celebrate his fiftieth
anniversary in January 2009 remains to be seen. Whatever the case, several generations of
Cubans have grown up with the values and practices that currently inform the experience
of Canada and that of Cuba's other major trading partners. That legacy will be neither
lightly nor rapidly transcended. History can instruct not only those otherwise doomed to
repeat the mistakes they have made, but also previous non-participants. Withal, the fore-
going message is only one Canadian observer's view of what Canadians have learned. But,
I am pleased to share it.
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